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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 93LIMA56, THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#93LIMA56**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
93LIMA56	1993-01-04 22:51	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Lima

Appears in these articles:
[elcomercio.pe](#)

R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [OAS](#) [PE](#)
SUBJECT: THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO

¶1. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF DEPA...

id: 594
date: 1/4/1993 22:51
refid: 93LIMA56
origin: Embassy Lima

classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

----- header ends -----

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [OAS](#) [PE](#)
SUBJECT: THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO

11. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENTAL VOTING PATTERNS, POVERTY LEVELS PROVED A MUCH BETTER PREDICTOR OF VOTING TURNOUT IN THE NOVEMBER 22 CCD ELECTIONS THAN DID THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO TERRORIST GROUP. THE IMPACT ON ABSTENTIONISM OF RELATIVE POVERTY WAS ALSO MUCH GREATER THAN ITS IMPACT ON SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT PARTY. END SUMMARY.

12. (U) SLIGHTLY LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE OAS RENDERED ITS VERDICT AND EIGHTEEN DAYS LATER THAN PERU'S NATIONAL ELECTION BOARD PROMISED, THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 22 CONSTITUENT CONGRESS ELECTIONS WERE ANNOUNCED. FOLLOWING IS A FIRST ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF POVERTY AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO ON VOTING TURNOUT AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS (CCD) ELECTIONS.

POVERTY AND THE VOTE

13. (C) BASED UPON DEPARTMENTAL VOTING FIGURES, THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, ABSENTEEISM AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ANALYZED USING SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TECHNIQUES FOR BIVARIATE DISTRIBUTIONS.

14. (C) IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT POVERTY AND POLITICAL VIEWS ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED IN THE CASE OF PERU, POVERTY APPEARS TO HAVE A MUCH GREATER IMPACT ON THE DECISION TO VOTE THAN IT DOES ON WHICH CANDIDATE OR PARTY A VOTER CHOSSES.

15. (C) TO LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, THE VOTE IN DEPARTMENTS WITHIN WHICH 48 OF PERU'S 50 MOST IMPOVERISHED PROVINCES (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO COUNTIES IN THE UNITED STATES) WAS COMPARED TO THE REST OF PERU. WHEN ABSENTEEISM AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" PARTY WERE COMPARED IN THE MOST POOR AND LEAST POOR DEPARTMENTS, THE IMPACT ON ABSTENTIONISM WAS MARKED. APPROXIMATELY 29.4 PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN NON-VOTING RATES CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY THE POVERTY FACTOR. IN CONTRAST, ONLY 10.8 PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE CAN BE EXPLAINED BY ECONOMIC IMPROVERISHMENT.

¶6. (C) WHY DID RELATIVE POVERTY APPEAR TO HAVE SUCH AN IMPACT ON THE VOTE? ALTHOUGH VOTING IS COMPULSORY IN PERU, CHANGING ONE'S VOTING LOCATION IS A DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS. THE OPTION OPEN TO PERUVIANS IS TO NOT VOTE AND EITHER PAY, OR HOPE TO EVADE THE 12 DOLLAR FINE FOR NON-VOTING. FOR THE POOR, WHO HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN ANY EVENT, THE RISK OF THE FINE EVER BEING COLLECTED IS MINIMAL. CONSTITUTIONS ARE SEE AS ABSTRACT DOCUMENTS WITH LITTLE IMPACT ON DAILY LIFE. THUS, IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION, IT APPEARS THAT IRRELEVANCE COMBINED WITH ECONOMIC NECESSITY COMBINED TO REDUCE VOTER TURNOUT IN PERU'S POOREST AREAS.

THE SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE VOTE

¶7. (C) MANY COMMENTATORS IN THE WAKE OF THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION CONGRATULATED PERUVIANS FOR DEFYING SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) THREATS AND CASTING THEIR BALLOTS. IN 1992, APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY WAS DECLARED TO BE IN A STATE EMERGENCY. JUST UNDER HALF OF PERU'S POPULATION (47.45 PERCENT) LIVED IN THESE EMERGENCY ZONES. TWO WAYS TO MEASURE THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE VOTE WOULD BE TO LOOK AT PERCENTAGES OF NON-VOTERS (THE FEAR FACTOR), OR LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT (REJECTION OF GUERRILLAS FACTOR) IN EMERGENCY ZONES VERSUS AREAS DECLARED FREE OF SUBSTANTIAL GUERRILLA INFLUENCE.

¶8. (C) WHEN NON-VOTING RATES IN DEPARTMENTS ALL OR PART OF WHICH WERE DECLARED "EMERGENCY ZONES" AS OF NOVEMBER 3 WERE COMPARED WITH DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 9.1 PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE COULD BE STATISTICALLY ACCOUNTED FOR.

¶9. (C) WHEN THE DIFFERENCE IN VOTING RATES IN DEPARTMENTS WHERE THERE WERE EMERGENCY ZONES IN NOVEMBER WERE COMPARED TO THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN ON THE LIST IN FEBRUARY, TEN MONTHS EARLIER, BUT REMOVED IN NOVEMBER, NO STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WERE DETECTED.

GUERRILLAS AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT

¶10. (C) IF THE ACT OF VOTING IS TAKEN AS A HIGHLY SYMBOLIC STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM, THIS SHOULD ALSO TRANSLATE INTO SOME DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. PARTICULARLY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SL FOUNDER AND LEADER ABIMAELE GUZMAN AND MUCH OF THE SL'S TOP LEADERSHIP, MANY EXPECTED THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE RECEIVED A SURGE OF SUPPORT. YET WHEN THE PERCENTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT VOTE (SUPPORT FOR THE "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE) IN DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT ANY EMERGENCY ZONE IS COMPARED SIMILAR VOTES IN DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 6.2 PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY THIS VARIABLE. THE DIFFERENCE ESSENTIALLY DISAPPEARS WHEN THE DEPARTMENTS WHICH HAD EMERGENCY ZONES IN FEBRUARY ARE COMPARED TO THE REST OF PERU. APPARENTLY, WHAT HAROLD WILSON SAID ABOUT POLITICS ALSO APPLIES TO PERUVIAN VOTERS' MEMORIES. THIS FINDING TALLIES WITH THE RESULTS OF FOCUS GROUP ANALYSES WHICH A GOVERNMENT POLITICAL CONSULTING FIRM PERFORMED. THIS FIRM FOUND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WERE INCREASINGLY THE FOCUS OF VOTER'S ATTENTION WITH THE PRESUMED RESOLUTION OF THE GUERRILLA PROBLEM FOLLOWING GUZMAN'S CAPTURE.

THE 1992 CONSTITUENT CONGRESS

11. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL LIST OF
INDIVIDUALS ELECTED TO THE CONSITUTENT CONGRESS
IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTIONS:

PARTY - NAMES OF REPRESENTATIVES

"NUEVA MAYORIA- CAMBIO 90"

JAIME YOSHIYAMA TANAKA
LUZ SALGADO RUBIANES
CARLOS TORRES Y TORRES LARA
VICTOR JOY WAY ROJAS
ANDRES REGGIARDO SAYAN
MIGUEL VELIT NUNEZ
CARLOS BLANCO OROPEZA
JOSE GAMONAL CRUZ
GILBERTO SIURA CESPEDES
JAIME FREUNDT-THURNE
ANASTACIO VEGA ASCENCIO
REYNALDO ROBERTS BILLIG
MANUEL LA TORRE BARDALES
JUAN HERMOZA RIOS
MARTHA CHAVEZ COSSIO
JORGE NAKAMURA HINOSTROZA
DEMETRIO PASTIAS MELLA
CESAR FERNANDEZ ARCE
CARLOS FERRERO COSTA
MARIA LOZADA DE GAMBOA
ROMULO GUERRA AYALA
JORGE VELASQUEZ URETA
DANIEL ZEVALLOS RIOS
MIGUEL PAJARES RUIZ
HUGO ZAMATA AGUIRRE
OSWALDO SANDOVAL AGUIRRE
JUAN HUAMANCHUMO ROMERO
PABLO TELLO TELLO
JUAN CRUZADO MANTILLA
SAMUEL MATSUDA NISHIMURA
PEDRO VILCHEZ MALPICA
TITO CHAVEZ ROMERO
CARLOS LEON TRELLES
MARIA VICTOR ALFARO
JORGE FIGUEROA VIZCARRA
NICOLASA VILLAR MARTINEZ
GENARO COLCHADO ARELLANO
GAMANIEL BARRETO ESTRADO
PEDRO GARCIA SAAVEDRA
VICTOR MELENDEZ CAMPOS
CARLOS REATEGUI TRIGOSO
ROGER AMURUZ GALLEGOS
RICARDO MARCENARO FRERS
GUILLERMO YSISOLA FARFAN

"PARTIDO POPULAR CRISTIANO"

LOURDES FLORES NANO
ANTERO FLORES ARAOZ
ALEXANDER KOURI BUMACHAR
LUIS BEDOYA DE VIVANCO
XAVIER BARRON CEBREROS
CELSO SOTOMARINO CHAVEZ
HECTOR CRUZ ARRUNAATEGUI
MARIO OCHARAN ZEGARRA

"FRENTE INDEPENDIENTE MORALIZADOR"

FERNANDO OLIVERA VEGA
ERNESTO GAMARRA OLIVARES
CARLOS CUARESMA SANCHEZ
CESAR LARRABURE GALVEZ
JULIO CHU MERIZ
HUMBERTO SABUCETTI PEDRAGLIO
WILLY SERRATO PUSE

"RENOVACION"

RAFAEL REY REY
GONZALO ORTIZ DE ZEVALLOS
ENRIQUE CHIRINOS SOTO
JUAN CARPIO MUNOZ
FRANCISCO TUDELA VAN BREUGEL
JUAN CARRION RUIZ

"MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO DE IZQUIERDA"

GLORIA HELFER PALACIOS
HENRY PEASE GARCIA
JULIO CASTRO GOMEZ
JULIO DIAZ PALACIOS

"COORDINADORA DEMOCRATICA"

JOSE BARBA CABALLERO
JORGE DONAIRE LOZANA
LUIS TORD ROMERO
JORGE TORRES VALLEJO

"FRENATRACA"

ROGER CACERES VELASQUEZ
PEDRO CACERES VELASQUEZ
JORGE VELASQUEZ GONZALES

"FREPA"

MARIO PAREDES CUEVA
EUSEBIO VICUNA VASQUEZ

"SODE"

MANUEL MOREYRA LOREDA

"MOVIMIENTO INDEPIENTE AGRARIO"

GUSTAVO GARCIA MUNDACA

¶12. (C) COMMENT: BASED UPON A DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL ANALYSIS OF VOTING PATTERNS, POVERTY APPEARS TO HAVE HAD A MUCH STRONGER IMPACT ON THE VOTING DECISION IN THE CCD ELECTIONS THAN THE SENDERO. THE TERRORIST GROUP'S RELATIVE LACK OF IMPACT ON THE VOTING MAY BE DUE IN PART TO A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. IT WAS WIDELY BELIEVED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS THAT THE SL CONSIDERED THE CCD ELECTIONS ESSENTIALLY UNIMPORTANT. WHILE THE SL CONDUCTED A TERROR BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN LIMA IN THE WEEK BEFORE THE ELECTION, THE ATTACKS HAD TAPERED OFF SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE THE VOTING. IF THE SL HAD HOPED TO HAVE AN IMPACT IN NOVEMBER WITH THIS LAST MINUTE EFFORT, IT APPARENTLY FAILED. IF THE GOVERNMENT HAD HOPED TO RECEIVE A "GRATITUDE VOTE" FROM A GRATEFUL POPULATION, IT TOO WAS DISAPPOINTED. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE CCD, THE RESULTS REFLECT MOSTLY THEIR BETTER ORGANIZATION AND FULLER COFFERS. CONTRIBUTING TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY WAS ALSO HIGH LEVELS OF OPPOSITION DISORGANIZATION AND POOR TACTICAL DECISIONS BY APRA AND ACCION POPULAR TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTION.

¶13. (C) THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN PERU IS CONSIDERED A SUB-FIELD OF LEGAL STUDIES AND THIS TRADITIONAL, NON-QUANTATIVE BENT IS REFLECTED IN THE ANALYSIS OF PERUVIAN SOCIAL INVESTIGATORS. SINCE EMERGENCY ZONES DO NOT, IN MOST CASES, CORRESPOND EXACTLY WITH POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS COMPARING PRECINCT TALLIES WITH EMERGENCY ZONES AND POVERTY WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE EXACT NATURE AND IMPACT OF THESE VARIABLES.

¶14. (C) SUCH A DETAILED, QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS

MAY BE A LONG-TIME COMING. MOST OF THE
COMMENTARY THUS FAR PRODUCED BY PERUVIAN
POLITICIANS, INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICIANS
FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION HAS BEEN
IMPRESSIONISTIC, HISTORICAL AND SUBJECTIVE. ONE
LONG-TIME STUDENT OF THE IMPACT OF GUERRILLAS
AND VOTING INSISTED TO POLOFFS DECEMBER 31 THAT
THE SL OBVIOUSLY HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE
NOVEMBER 22 VOTE. UNFORTUNATELY, SHE HAD NO
DATA OR ANALYSIS TO BACK UP HER GUT FEELING.

BRAYSHAW##

=====CABLE ENDS=====